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Abstract 
Gender Equality in German Constitutional Law* 
by Michael Wrase 
The fundamental right to gender equality has played an important role in Germa-
ny’s more recent constitutional history. The rulings of the Federal Constitutional 
Court (FCC, Bundesverfassungsgericht) and other courts have developed doctrinal 
standards that are relevant to anti-discrimination legislation overall. This article 
provides a brief history of gender equality in the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 
and its concretization in key Constitutional Court decisions from 1949 until today. 
A special emphasis is on the legal doctrine of non-discrimination and on the in-
fluence of feminist legal scholars. The article concludes with a discussion of af-
firmative action measures from the perspective of constitutional law. 
                                                 
* A German version of this article will be published in Lena Foljanty and Ulrike Lembke (eds), Femi-
nistische Rechtswissenschaft (3rd edn, Nomos, forthcoming). 
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1. History of equal rights in the Federal Republic of Germany 
a) ‘Men and women shall have equal rights.’—How gender equali-
ty became part of Germany’s Basic Law 
The provision that ‘men and women shall have equal rights’ only became part of 
Germany’s Basic Law after some substantial struggles. The policy committee 
(Grundsatzausschuss) of the Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat) initially 
preferred the wording, ‘Men and women shall have the same rights and duties as 
citizens’. This essentially represented the existing legal norms according to the 
Weimar Constitution.1 When representative Frieda Nadig (SPD) objected that equal 
rights for women should not be restricted to their rights and duties as citizens but 
should also be implemented in family law and all other legal domains, committee 
members voiced their concern that ‘this would make the Civil Code unconstitu-
tional’.2 Based on the argument that this would create too much legal uncertainty, 
the broader motion of the SPD group was rejected in the main committee as well. 
It was only thanks to the energetic involvement of representative Elisabeth Sel-
bert—one of the ‘four mothers’ of the Basic Law3—that the Parliamentary Council 
was forced to revise its decision. After the proposal calling for full equality was 
defeated, women’s organisations across Germany started extra-parliamentary 
activities beginning in mid-December 1948 to fight for the SPD’s straightforward 
formulation that ‘men and women shall have equal rights’. A wave of petitions 
reached the Parliamentary Council.4 Elisabeth Selbert herself spoke of a ‘storm 
initiated outside in the realm of public opinion about the main committee’s vote 
on this article at the first reading’,5 whereas FDP representative and soon-to-be 
federal president Theodor Heuss later tried to play down the protests, conde-
                                                 
1 The corresponding passage in Art. 109 of the Weimar Constitution read: ‘Men and women have the 
same fundamental rights and duties as citizens.’ 
2 Comment by Representative Dehler, cf Ines Reich-Hilweg, Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt 
(Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1979) 19. 
3 Of the 65 representatives in the Parliamentary Council, only four were women: Frieda Nadig (SPD), 
Elisabeth Selbert (SPD), Helene Weber (CDU), and Helene Wessel (Center). With the exception of Elisa-
beth Selbert, the female representatives were rather reserved when it came to supporting the goal of 
full gender equality, cf Barbara Böttcher, Das Recht auf Gleichheit und Differenz (Westfälisches 
Dampfboot, 1990) 169-170. 
4 Documented in Ines Reich-Hilweg, Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt (Europäische Verlagsan-
stalt, 1979) 21-22. 
5 See the minutes of the second reading in the main committee on 18 Jan 1949, in Barbara Böttcher, 
Das Recht auf Gleichheit und Differenz (Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1990) 217. 
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scendingly calling them a ‘puff of air, as it were’.6 Whatever the case, the negative 
feedback had such an impact on the representatives in the Parliamentary Council 
that the equal rights article, as proposed by the SPD, was subsequently passed by a 
large majority. Symptomatically, one CDU representative conceded that their per-
spective on the issue had been ‘too legalistic and not political enough’.7 Women 
scored their first major victory towards gender equality in Germany.8 
b) The legal doctrine of the equality provision 
In legal doctrine, three steps are relevant when interpreting Article 3(2),(3) GG: 
The first is to define what ‘equality’ and ‘equal rights’ are supposed to mean (is it 
about formal or substantive equality, etc.). The next step is to evaluate on a case-
by-case basis whether discrimination has in fact occurred. If the answer is yes, 
the third step is to consider possible justifications for this discrimination. 
Despite the special emphasis on equal rights of men and women in Article 3(2) GG, 
the equal rights provisions in Article 3(2) GG and Article 3(2) GG were uniformly 
interpreted from the beginning to imply a prohibition of discrimination, that is, a 
right to formal equal treatment.9 After the four-year transition period contained 
in Article 117(1) GG had expired, the Federal Constitutional Court, in a 1953 land-
mark ruling, held the equal rights provision to be directly binding law.10 This 
means that all legislation evidently inconsistent with the equal rights provision 
became ineffective with the end of the transition period—in theory, at least. In 
practice, it took much longer until all direct unequal treatments disadvantaging 
women, especially in family law, were abolished.11 Up until the late 1990s, FCC 
                                                 
6 Barbara Böttcher, Das Recht auf Gleichheit und Differenz (Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1990) 222. 
7 Comment by Representative Walter Strauss, cited in Barbara Böttcher, Das Recht auf Gleichheit und 
Differenz (Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1990) 215. 
8 Elisabeth Selbert gave an impressive account of her feelings after her success in the Parliamentary 
Council: ‘I had won, and I don’t know if I can describe to you the feeling I had in that moment. I had 
held an ounce of power in my hand, and I made use of it, in all the depth, in all the breadth I could 
rhetorically command. It was the crowning moment of my life when this led to the adoption of equal 
rights for women.’ Written down by Barbara Böttcher, Das Recht auf Gleichheit und Differenz (Westfäli-
sches Dampfboot, 1990) 166. 
9 Cf Theresia Degener, ‘Der Streit um Gleichheit und Differenz in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
seit 1945’ in Ute Gerhard (ed.), Frauen in der Geschichte des Rechts (CH Beck, 1997) 881. 
10 BVerfGE 3, 225 (239f). 
11 It was not until 1991, for example, that the rule according to which the husband’s last name auto-
matically became the marital name unless the two marriage partners had chosen one of their birth 
names to become the marital name, was declared unconstitutional, cf BVerfGE 84, 9. 
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rulings on Article 3(2),(3) GG can be roughly divided into three phases12; a fourth 
phase has emerged since 2000. 
c) Early Constitutional Court rulings: ‘Equal value but different 
natures and functions’ 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the court assumed the existence of natural differences 
between men and women that determined their social roles, with men constitut-
ing the norm. Equality, the court insisted, should not be confused with an arbi-
trary levelling of difference (Gleichmacherei); rather, equality was based on equal 
value that acknowledges difference.13 To the court, differences between the sexes 
were evident in different family-related duties, but most importantly in mother-
hood, in which female nature was assumed to be most deeply rooted and best able 
to unfold.14 Accordingly, exceptions to the rule of equal legal treatment based on 
‘objective biological and functional (division-of-labour-related) differences be-
tween men and women’ were conceived broadly.15 The equal rights clause, the 
court opined, was not designed to eliminate the ‘natural’ differences between men 
and women. Rather, the court believed its own role was to ensure that women did 
not experience any disadvantages because of their ‘different nature’. As a conse-
quence, the FCC also issued a number of decisions that were quite progressive at 
the time, bringing real improvements to the legal situation of women.16 For ex-
ample, the fathers’ right to make the final decision in questions of childrearing 
and their exclusive right to legally represent the child were declared unconstitu-
tional17, as was intestate succession according to antiquated regulations pertain-
ing to the administration of family farms (Höfeordnung), which gave priority to 
male heirs in estate matters.18 Furthermore, the FCC demanded that the work of 
women ‘as mothers, housewives, and helpers’ be recognized in the social insur-
                                                 
12 Cf Ute Sacksofsky, ‘Article 3(2),(3) sentence 1’ in Dieter C. Umbach and Thomas Clemens (eds.), GG-
Kommentar (CH Beck, 2002). 
13 BVerfGE 3, 225 (241). The court based its view on a statement Elisabeth Selbert had made in the 
main committee of the Parliamentary Council: ‘It is a fundamental error to assume sameness when it 
comes to equal rights. Equality is based on equal value, which acknowledges difference.’ cf Barbara 
Böttcher, Das Recht auf Gleichheit und Differenz (Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1990) 218. 
14 BVerfGE 10, 59 (78). 
15 Cf BVerfGE 5, 9 (12); 6, 389 (422ff), other references in Ute Sacksofsky, ‘Article 3(2),(3) sentence 1’ 
in Dieter C. Umbach and Thomas Clemens (eds.), GG-Kommentar (CH Beck, 2002) para 337. 
16 Ute Sacksofsky, ‘Article 3(2),(3) sentence 1’ in Dieter C. Umbach and Thomas Clemens (eds.), GG-
Kommentar (CH Beck, 2002) para 339. 
17 BVerfGE 10, 59. 
18 BVerfGE 15, 337. 
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ance system,19 thereby acknowledging at least partially the economic value of 
these activities. Well into the 1960s, therefore, the court issued rulings that at 
least counteracted the restorationist tendencies in legal policy at the time.20 This 
achievement must arguably be credited in no small part to Constitutional Court 
Justice Erna Scheffler, then the only female justice on the FCC21 and a fierce 
champion of gender equality.22 
d) The 1970s and 1980s: The elimination of unequal legal treat-
ment 
In the second phase, the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC put more and more emphasis on 
gender equality. This corresponded to the transformations brought on by the new 
women’s movement. Outdated gender roles could no longer be justified by ‘natu-
ral differences’ or ‘the different natures and functions’ of men and women.23 In its 
1975 ruling on widow’s pensions, the FCC stated that the earlier understanding of 
women’s role in marriage and the family had changed. It was no longer assumed 
that ‘a woman must first and foremost be a housewife. Rather, other possible roles 
are recognized’.24 Accordingly, most laws and regulations directly discriminating 
women were eliminated until the mid-1980s. Seminal FCC decisions in that regard 
concerned disadvantages in terms of citizenship25 and the requirement that all 
family members take the husband’s family name.26 
                                                 
19 BVerfGE 17, 1. 
20 Sabine Berghahn, ‘Der Ritt auf der Schnecke: Rechtliche Gleichstellung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland’ in Mechthild Koreuber and Ute Mager (eds.), Recht und Geschlecht (Nomos, 2004) 61. 
21 Between 1951 and 1986, the Federal Constitutional Court only had one female justice at a time 
serving in the First Senate (in this order: Erna Scheffner, Wiltraud Rupp-von Brünneck, Gisela Nie-
meyer). Between 1986 and 1994, at least two of the court’s sixteen justices were women; cf Renate 
Jaeger, ‘Frauen verändern die Justiz - verändern Frauen die Justiz?’ (1998) 1/98 Streit 3, 5. Between 
1994 and 2006, the FCC consistently had at least four, at times even five female justices. When Evelyn 
Haas retired from the First Senate in 2006, only three of the sixteen were women. The appointment 
of Susanne Baer and Gabriele Britz in February 2011, following a proposal made by SPD and Greens, 
put the share of female justices back to four. At present, with the appointment of Susanne Ott in 
November 2016, the number of female justices at the FCC has even risen to seven, falling just one 
short of equal representation in both senates.  
22 Cf Renate Jaeger, ‘Frauen verändern die Justiz - verändern Frauen die Justiz?’ (1998) 1/98 Streit 3, 
6–7. 
23 Ute Sacksofsky, ‘Article 3(2),(3) sentence 1’ in Dieter C. Umbach and Thomas Clemens (eds), GG-
Kommentar (CH Beck, 2002) para 341. 
24 BVerfGE 39, 169 (187). 
25 BVerfGE 37, 217. 
26 BVerfGE 48, 327; cf also the (late) decision BVerfGE 84, 9. 
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On the other side, male claimants now increasingly turned against the remaining 
‘patriarchal privileges’ of women.27 As a result of these successful constitutional 
complaints filed by men, the legal rule making a widower’s pension, but not a 
widow’s, dependent on whether the deceased spouse had mostly supported the 
family,28 was declared unconstitutional, as was the provision that granted women 
working outside the house one paid ‘housework’ holiday a month but denied the 
same advantage to single men.29 By contrast, the mother’s exclusive custody for 
children born out of wedlock was found to comply with Art. 3 (2), (3) GG,30 as was 
the rule allowing women to retire earlier (at 60) than men (at 65).31 The ruling on 
the retirement age was the first in which the court held that an unequal treat-
ment of men and women may also be permissible if it serves to compensate for 
disadvantages occurring in social reality.32 However, this crucial aspect of protec-
tion against discrimination was only to gain traction in the rulings of the 1990s. 
e) The night work decision and the promise of de facto equality 
The Constitutional Court’s night work decision of January 1992 became the turn-
ing point in favour of an active equal rights interpretation of Article 3(2),(3) GG.33 
Employment statutes at the time contained a prohibition on women working be-
tween 8 pm and 6 am on weekdays. The FCC refused to accept the reasoning given 
by legislators, namely that the ban served to ‘protect’ women from health hazards 
caused by night work, as a reason for differential treatment and declared the rule 
unconstitutional. Gender distinctions were only permissible, the court stated, ‘if 
they are indispensably necessary for the solution of problems that by their nature 
can arise only for women or only for men.’34 The court found no indication in oc-
cupational health research supporting the assumption that female workers, owing 
to their physical constitution, were more disadvantaged by working at night than 
                                                 
27 Ute Sacksofsky, ‘Article 3(2),(3) sentence 1’ in Dieter C. Umbach and Thomas Clemens (eds), GG-
Kommentar (CH Beck, 2002) para 341. 
28 BVerfGE 39, 169. 
29 BVerfGE 52, 370. 
30 BVerfGE 56, 363. 
31 BVerfGE 74, 163 (180). The 1989 Pension Reform Act mandated that the retirement age limit for 
women be gradually raised to that of men beginning in 2001; with the 1999 Pension Reform Act, the 
beginning of this alignment process was scheduled to begin one year earlier, in 2000.  
32 In this decision, the court referred to a ‘typifying compensation of disadvantages which in turn 
originate in biological causes’, B\erfGE 74, 163 (180). This is despite the fact that the reference to 
biological differences had become quite loose, see Ute Sacksofsky, ‘Article 3(2),(3) sentence 1’ in Diet-
er C. Umbach and Thomas Clemens (eds.), GG-Kommentar (CH Beck, 2002) para 343. 
33 BVerfGE 85, 191. 
34 BVerfGE 85, 191 (207). 
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their male counterparts. Insofar as studies did show that women are more seri-
ously harmed by night work, this conclusion was generally traced to the fact that 
they were also burdened with housework and child-rearing during the day. This, 
however, the court held, was an effect of social roles and not a sex-specific char-
acteristic. Rather, the prohibition to work at night substantially disadvantaged 
women in their search for employment and restricted them in their free com-
mand over their working hours.35 
The FCC ruling had far-reaching consequences not only because it called, for the 
first time, for a strict interpretation of the equal treatment provision—giving up 
the formula of ‘functional differences’ (as regards the division of work) between 
men and women. Incidentally, as it were, the court also stated that the regulatory 
content of Article 3(2) GG went beyond that of Article 3(3) GG by demanding that 
the constitutional mandate to promote equal rights be extended to social reality. 
The provision that ‘men and women shall have equal rights’, the court went on, 
was designed not only to abolish legal norms that link advantages or disad-
vantages to gender-specific characteristics but to enforce equal rights for men 
and women in the future.36 In this way, the court created the possibility to use 
Article 3(2) GG to legitimate affirmative action policies designed to compensate 
for gender-specific discrimination in society.37 Furthermore, Constitutional Court 
justices also opened their judicial doctrine towards a substantive understanding 
of equality targeting the elimination of real disadvantages. 
2. Equality and legal doctrine on fundamental rights: On the 
interpretation of Article 3 Section 2, sentence 1 and Section 
3, sentence 1 GG 
a) Article 3 (2),(3) GG as a strict prohibition of discrimination 
Today, there is universal agreement that Article 3(3) GG contains a strict prohibi-
tion of the unequal legal treatment of men and women. This prohibition of dis-
crimination prohibits all government measures that discriminate directly by gen-
der. According to the night work formula of the FCC, rules involving gender-based 
distinctions are only compatible with Article 3(3) GG if they are indispensably nec-
                                                 
35 BVerfGE 85, 191 (208ff). In the same year, by contrast, the Austrian Constitutional Court declared 
the prohibition of night work for women constitutional (VfSlg 13038/1992). For critical comments 
on this decision, see Elisabeth Holzleithner, Recht Macht Geschlecht (Facultas, 2002) 54ff. 
36 BVerfGE 85, 191 (207). 
37 Also stated in explicit terms in the later decision on the firefighter fee, BVerfGE 92, 91 (109). 
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essary because of biological differences between men and women, that is, if they 
are inevitable in practice. Beyond rules directly related to pregnancy, birth, and 
lactation, it is thus hard to imagine any legitimate kind of unequal treatment 
based on this criterion.38 Conflicting constitutional law may be another reason to 
justify unequal treatment. In this context, the equal rights mandate in Article 3(2) 
GG is most relevant, entitling lawmakers and public administrators to compensate 
for de facto disadvantages, which typically affect women, by preferential treat-
ment and to promote the equal treatment of women.39 
The prohibition of discrimination primarily applies to government authorities. 
Indirectly, however, via the so-called ‘radiating’ effects of fundamental rights40, it 
also becomes increasingly ingrained in private law by influencing its interpreta-
tion and application.41 In such cases, however, it is always important to balance 
the goal of equal treatment on the one hand against the freedom to pursue a trade 
or profession (Article 12(1) GG) and the private autonomy (Article 2(1) GG) of ser-
vice providers on the other hand.42 
b) The group-related perspective 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, new approaches to interpreting Article 3(2),(3) GG 
emerged in the legal literature that called for a stronger group-related perspec-
tive. This was triggered not least by the constitutional debates about gender 
equality policies and positive action in favour of women, especially the ‘fight over 
quotas’. What the new approaches had in common was a group-related, asymmet-
rical perspective, which understood Article 3(2) GG as actively promoting the 
rights of women rather than only prohibiting unequal treatment. The goal was to 
counter the societal dominance of men in the various areas of life by means of a 
                                                 
38 Marion Eckertz-Höfer, ‘Art. 3(2),(3)’ in Erhard Denninger and others (eds.), Alternativkommentar 
zum GG (CH Beck, 2001) para 56; Ute Sacksofsky, ‘Article 3(2),(3) sentence 1’ in Dieter C. Umbach and 
Thomas Clemens (eds.), GG-Kommentar (CH Beck, 2002) para 348. 
39 BVerfGE 92, 91 (109) 
40 For a general discussion, see Horst Dreier, ‘Introduction’ in Horst Dreier (ed.), GG-Kommentar (vol 
1, 3rd edn, 2013) 96ff. 
41 Cf Dieter Grimm, ‘The role of fundamental rights after sixty-five years of constitutional jurispru-
dence in Germany’ (2015) 13 I-CON 9, 21-23. 
42 Cf Michael Wrase, ‘\erfassungsrechtliche Ansatzpunkte für einen Diskriminierungsschutz beim 
öffentlichen Angebot von Gütern und Dienstleistungen’ Zesar 2005, 229, 236f; in practice, this prob-
lem arises in the gender-based premiums of private health insurance providers, for example, cf 
Michael Wrase/Susanne Baer, ‘Unterschiedliche Tarife für Männer und Frauen in der privaten Kran-
kenversicherung – ein \erstoß gegen den Gleichheitssatz des Grundgesetzes?’ (2004) 23 NJW 1623; 
now also see Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Con-
seil des ministers [2011] ECR I-00773. 
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material or substantive43 prohibition of discrimination, that is, by creating real 
equality of opportunity between men and women. It was not least feminist legal 
scholars who contributed with their work to advance the legal doctrine on equali-
ty44 and thereby influenced the jurisdiction of the FCC as well. 
Authors such as Vera Slupik or Sibylle Raasch interpret Article 3(2) GG as an im-
perative to collectively promote women.45 From their point of view, the collective 
dimension of the issue rests in the fact that ‘gender’, as ‘race’ or ‘origin’, is a 
group-related category, that is, an (ascribed) characteristic that makes the indi-
vidual a member of the respective group.46 Traditional gender roles are so deeply 
engrained in this, the authors argue, that all women are affected. Vera Slupik 
talks about the ‘social fate of women’ in this context.47 The goal of the constitu-
tional mandate to create gender equality, according to Slupik, is the social ideal of 
gender parity, realized in a ‘potential role reversal’: ‘Potential role reversal means 
creating a situation in which the discriminated gender, that is, women, makes use 
of the de facto advantages of the dominant gender.’48 In this way, it becomes pos-
sible to justify quotas in decision-making, for example, because they reverse the 
advantage that men typically enjoy in the hiring process. 
c) Article 3(2) GG as a prohibition of dominance and hierarchiza-
tion 
In opposition to the interpretation of Article 3(2) GG as a prohibition of discrimi-
nation, but also opposed to those who view it as a collective right, Ute Sacksofsky, 
and later Susanne Baer, drawing on the US debate, propose an understanding of 
discrimination that does not focus on social groups (men/women, blacks/whites, 
people with/without disabilities) but rather on the power structure that exists 
between them. When it comes to characteristics such as gender, race, religion, or 
                                                 
43 Dagmar Schiek’s terminology, in Dagmar Schiek and others (eds.), Frauengleichstellungsgesetze des 
Bundes und der Länder (2nd edn, Bund, 2002) para 257. 
44 Especially Vera Slupik, Die Entscheidung des Grundgesetzes für Parität im Geschlechterverhältnis 
(Duncker & Humblot, 1988); Sibylle Raasch, Frauenquoten und Männerrechte (Nomos, 1991); Ute 
Sacksofsky, Das Grundrecht auf Gleichberechtigung (2nd edn, Nomos, 1996); Susanne Baer, Würde 
oder Gleichheit? (Nomos, 1995); Christine Fuchsloch, Das Verbot der mittelbaren Geschlechtsdiskri-
minierung (Nomos, 1995). 
45 Vera Slupik, Die Entscheidung des Grundgesetzes für Parität im Geschlechterverhältnis (Duncker 
& Humblot, 1988); Sibylle Raasch, Frauenquoten und Männerrechte (Nomos, 1991) 79; Sibylle Raasch, 
Frauenquoten und Männerrechte (Nomos, 1991) 148ff. 
46 Vera Slupik, Die Entscheidung des Grundgesetzes für Parität im Geschlechterverhältnis (Duncker 
& Humblot, 1988) 80. 
47 Ibid 81. 
48 Ibid 86. 
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disability, individuals are not discriminated against on the basis of their individu-
al characteristics but on the basis of their ascribed affiliation to a group defined 
by that characteristic. Prejudices and derogatory views existing towards such a 
group are projected on individuals.49 Whether or not a given policy is unlawful, 
therefore, is not determined by whether a protected characteristic such as gender 
or skin colour is used as a point of reference but rather by the effects a policy has 
on the specially protected group.50 Accordingly, Ute Sacksofsky sees Article 3(2) GG 
as a prohibition of dominance (Dominierungsverbot). Based on that reading, the 
group that enjoys economic and political power in a community is legally prohib-
ited from disadvantaging, or ‘dominating’, underprivileged groups. Public authori-
ties, Sacksofsky argues, are legally barred from both (1) defining women in terms 
of their traditional role or perpetuating that role, and from (2) adding unjustified 
disadvantages to the adoption of traditional roles.51 However, unlike Vera Slupik, 
for example, Ute Sacksofsky does not propagate a group law for women but only a 
group reference. Protection is granted only to individuals; it is only the concept of 
discrimination that is defined from the perspective of gender groups and their 
power structure in society. 
Susanne Baer is even more rigorous in her rejection of any understanding of 
equality as a formal prohibition of discrimination. Any asymmetrical interpreta-
tion of the right to equality, she argues, may only be interested in the difference 
between two individuals if that difference represents a societal hierarchization. In 
this manner, the perspective of the person concerned is set against the dominant 
perspective.52 The prohibition of discrimination is violated, according to Baer, 
whenever hierarchies manifest in society are stabilized or promoted. From that 
point of view, legal regulations pertaining to abortion, for example, which have a 
special impact on women as a social group, would have to be reviewed according 
to aspects of equality.53 Susanne Baer’s argument is not only about the fact that 
adopting certain social roles is connected to disadvantages. Rather, her concern is 
with overcoming a division of roles that involves disadvantages as such. 
Drawing on the empirical studies and theoretical work of US legal scholar and 
feminist Catharine MacKinnon, Susanne Baer shows that the right against sexual 
harassment at the workplace is inseparably linked to sexualized constructions of 
                                                 
49 Ute Sacksofsky, Das Grundrecht auf Gleichberechtigung (2nd edn, Nomos, 1996) 312. 
50 Ibid 314. 
51 Ibid 325–326. 
52 Susanne Baer, Würde oder Gleichheit? (Nomos, 1995) 237. 
53 Ibid 240. 
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‘women’ and ‘men’. According to Baer, it manifests an understanding of social 
gender that defines women as subdued and men as aggressively superior. An ade-
quately understood right against sexual discrimination must begin with an effort 
to overcome such constructions of social roles. 
Today, European anti-discrimination directives, as the well as the German General 
Equal Treatment Act (AGG), explicitly frame forms of harassment, including sexual 
harassment at the workplace, as a problem of discrimination (among other 
things)54—a conclusion that German legal doctrine of fundamental rights theory 
has yet to adopt. 
d) Elimination of the gender-binary understanding of equality 
An important step towards overcoming the obsolete gender-binary interpretation 
of Article 3(2), sentence 1,(3) GG was made by authors such as Laura Adamietz, wo 
interprets the prohibition of gender-based discrimination as a ‘prohibition of ex-
pectations’.55 Drawing on FCC decisions and social-constructivist approaches in 
gender studies, she develops a theoretical approach that also includes instances of 
discrimination against LGBTI*. The prohibition of discrimination, Adamietz argues, 
must not build on preconceived categories such as man and woman, with their 
strong biological connotations; rather, it must respond to the (social) expectations 
of role- and gender-compliant behaviour. People who discriminate on the basis of 
gender do so because they expect a person to behave in a certain way according to 
the gender assigned to that person. Or they will sanction any kind of behaviour 
that does not meet the expectations regarding the behaviour of persons with that 
kind of gender.56 
In a landmark decision of October 2017 regarding the entry of a third gender cat-
egory (besides male and female) into the birth register pursuant to § 22 of the 
Civil Status Act, the FCC extended the protection of Article 3(3) GG to sexual identi-
ties beyond the obsolete binary concept of gender. The provision of gender equali-
ty, the Court argued, does not only protect men against discrimination based on 
their male sex and women against discrimination based on their female sex but 
also persons who permanently identify with neither of these two categories 
against discrimination based on this neither exclusively male nor exclusively fe-
                                                 
54 Cf Article 2(3) Directive 2000/78/EC, Article 2(3) Directive 2000/43/EC; Article 1a Directive 
76/207/EEC; the legal definitions of harassment or sexual harassment as a subcase of discrimination 
are found in Article 3(3),(4) AGG. 
55 Laura Adamietz, Geschlecht als Erwartung (Nomos, 2011). 
56 Laura Adamietz, ‘Geschlecht als Erwartung’ (2013) 4/13 Streit 156, 165. 
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male gender.57 This applies irrespective of the fact that, historically, the members 
of the Parliamentary Council, when writing the German constitution, naturally 
assumed a binary concept of sex. And while it is true that Article 3(2) GG refers to 
‘men’ and ‘women’, the Court explained, that does not mean that the German term 
‘Geschlecht’, which can be translated as both ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, today can only 
mean men and women. After all, the purpose of this provision was mainly to 
eliminate gender-based discrimination against women.58 Rather, ‘given today’s 
knowledge of other gender identities’, these identities must be included in the 
protection against discrimination in line with the purpose of Article 3(3) GG, 
which is ‘to protect persons from being disfavoured that belong to groups struc-
turally prone to being discriminated against’.59 In its decision, the FCC also made 
explicit reference to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which also defined pro-
tection against gender discrimination broadly by including discriminations linked 
to a person’s gender reassignment.60 
e) The new jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court 
Beginning with the night work decision, substantive approaches to interpreting 
Article 3(2), (3) GG have increasingly found their way into FCC jurisdiction. Espe-
cially in recent years, the court has reviewed laws also with respect to their de 
facto discriminatory effects on women in social reality.61 Insofar, it is possible to 
speak of a new (fourth) phase of jurisdiction. 
For the first time in an orbiter dictum, the FCC in 1993 stated with reference to the 
decisions of the ECJ that a link to gender pursuant to Article 3(3) GG may also ap-
ply if ‘a provision worded in a gender-neutral way predominantly concerns wom-
en and if this may be traced to natural or social differences between the sexes’.62 
In its ruling on double family names of January 2002, the court explicitly re-
viewed the question of whether the legal exclusion of a double name for a child 
                                                 
57 BVerfGE 147, 1 (28) para 58. 
58 Ibid para 59. 
59 Ibid para 61. 
60 BVerfGE 147, 1 (28) para 58; Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143, 
para 20. 
61 Cf BVerfGE 89, 276. According to the FCC, the rule of Article 611a BGB, old version (protection 
against gender-based discrimination at the workplace, especially in hiring situations; now integrat-
ed into AGG, cf Article 7 compared to Article 6(1) and Article 1 AGG) specifies the protective purpose 
of Article 3(2) GG. This must be considered by courts when interpreting and applying this rule. Ac-
cordingly, any interpretation running counter to the protective purpose, for instance by requiring 
excessive evidence, is unlawful. 
62 BVerfGE 97, 35 (43). 
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represents a de facto discrimination of women, because women tend to be more 
willing to give up their family name if parents disagree about their child’s family 
name. The court found that women were not discriminated against by this possi-
bility, given the ‘at best slight impact on the implementation of Article 3(2) GG’.63 
Nevertheless, these decisions paved the way for the judicial review of de facto 
discrimination under German constitutional law. 
The Court’s 18 November 2003 decision64 on the constitutionality of the Maternity 
Leave Act (Mutterschutzgesetz, MuSchG) and the 5 April 2005 decision65 on child-
raising periods in the pension fund for lawyers may be considered landmark rul-
ings in FCC case law on gender-based discrimination. The decision on the Materni-
ty Leave Act originally concerned the question of whether requiring employers to 
make maternity leave payments while mothers are legally prohibited from work-
ing (six weeks before and eight weeks after childbirth) represents a violation of 
employers’ right to occupational freedom under Article 12 GG. Occasioned by a 
constitutional complaint lodged by several German companies, the Court debated 
whether the provision of Sec. 14(1) MuSchG violated ‘the equal rights provision in 
Article 3(2) GG, which is to be considered in systematic interpretations of the con-
stitution’.66 The Court found that the state has a wide margin of appreciation as to 
how to promote the implementation of equal rights for women and men in prac-
tice. However, legislators must address the danger that protective measures taken 
by the state may have discriminatory effects in the real world of work and com-
pensate for such effects as much as possible.67 Against this background, the court 
declared the contested provision in the MuSchG to be unconstitutional. Because 
employing women exposes employers to the risk of having to pay cash benefits to 
supplement public maternity leave payments in the case of motherhood (with the 
employer’s contribution representing the higher amount), the provision in the 
MuSchG may de facto restrict the employment opportunities of women. For that 
reason, the Court ruled, legislators were required to compensate employers for 
this financial burden, for instance by installing a redistribution scheme that dis-
tributes the additional costs across all employers, regardless of the proportion of 
women in their workforce. Yet such a redistributive scheme only existed for small 
enterprises with up to 20 employees. To compensate larger enterprises, the FCC 
                                                 
63 BVerfGE 104, 373 (395). 
64 BVerfGE 109, 64. 
65 BVerfGE 113, 1. 
66 BVerfGE 109, 64 (89). 
67 BVerfGE 109, 64 (90). 
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required that the regulation had to be revised. Since 2006, the redistributive 
scheme has been in place for all enterprises.68 
The ruling on the pension funds for lawyers was based on a constitutional com-
plaint lodged by a female lawyer who sought to be exempt from paying member-
ship fees in the pension funds for lawyers in Baden-Württemberg during the time 
of her parental leave. In order to be exempt from having to make the high month-
ly payments while on parental leave, she was required to resign her entitlement 
to practice as a lawyer during that period, which entailed a number of disad-
vantages.69 The Court argued that in social reality, it is still women who are pre-
dominantly responsible for childcare and who fully or partially interrupt their 
employment for that purpose, at least temporarily. As a consequence, requiring 
members to pay fees even while on parental leave, or otherwise resign entirely 
from their occupation, was a regulation that predominantly affected women. This 
indirect discrimination would then have to be based on reasonable grounds. The 
court found that this was not the case, as the financial stability of the pension 
fund would not be affected by exempting parents from membership fees during 
the parental leave period.70 
f) Indirect discrimination 
The idea that indirect (or de facto) discrimination on the basis of gender violates 
the equal rights provision as well is now also explicitly accepted by the FCC. A 
more detailed jurisdiction on that matter initially emerged at the European lev-
el,71 but the principles identified there may in principle be applied to Article 
3(2),(3) GG as well.72 Indirect discrimination means (1) rules and practices that ap-
pear gender-neutral but (2) in practice lead to disadvantages primarily suffered 
by persons of one gender and (3) cannot be justified by such reasons that would 
satisfy a proportionality test.73 The proportionality test, in other words, is trig-
                                                 
68 Act on Employer Compensation and on the Amendment of Other Acts of 22 December 2005, BGBl I 
2005, 3686. 
69 In particular, the complainant lost pension claims in the case of occupational disability, cf BVerfGE 
113, 1 (16ff). 
70 BVerfGE 113, 1 (19ff). 
71 Cf Sebastian Krebber ‘Article 157’ in Christian Calliess/Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV-
Kommentar (5th edn, CH Beck, 2016) paras 39ff.; cf also Christine Fuchsloch, Das Verbot der mittel-
baren Geschlechtsdiskriminierung (Nomos, 1995) 34ff. 
72 Cf also BVerfG EuGRZ 2010, 336 (343). 
73 Cf Sebastian Krebber ‘Article 157’ in Christian Calliess/Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV-
Kommentar (5th edn, CH Beck, 2016) para 40 and the legal definition in the EU framework directive: 
Article 2 b) Directive 2000/78/EC. 
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gered by empirically supported differences in the degree to which men and wom-
en are affected by a regulation or practice. Cases of indirect discrimination occur 
in part-time employment, for example. The FCC found indirect discrimination to 
be at work in the case of cleaning staff employed by state hospitals in Hamburg 
who were spun out into a separate company when the hospitals were privatized. 
The right to continued employment was then only applied to those employed by 
the state hospitals, not to those employed by the subsidiary company. As the pro-
portion of women in the cleaning staff was 93.5 per cent and hence even exceeded 
the high proportion of women of nearly 70 per cent working at the hospital, the 
court found this unequal treatment to be a case of de facto discrimination of 
women.74 
g) Intersectional discrimination 
The legal literature continues to be divided on whether a review of indirect dis-
crimination is supported by Article 3(2) GG alone75 and hence limited to the char-
acteristic of ‘gender’ or whether it encompasses all of grounds of discrimination 
mentioned in Article 3(3) GG, that is, parentage, race, language, homeland and 
origin, faith, religious or political opinions and disability.76 The jurisdiction of the 
FCC tends visibly towards the latter direction.77 As Article 3(3) GG is intended to 
address the historical discrimination situation of social ‘groups’, it is not justified 
to reduce the review of indirect discrimination to gender-based discrimination. 
This is especially evident in cases of intersectional discrimination, that is, when 
persons are affected in a specific manner on grounds of gender in combination 
with other characteristics.78 For example, in its 2015 decision on the prohibition 
of the expression of religious beliefs for teachers, the FCC found that, at present, 
provisions in that regard ‘de facto quite predominantly affect Muslim women who 
                                                 
74 B\erfG EuGRZ 2010, 336 (343); however, the FCC’s review of unequal treatment was primarily 
guided by the standard of Article 3(1) GG. 
75 e.g. Marion Eckertz-Höfer, ‘Art. 3(2),(3)’ in Erhard Denninger and others (eds.), Alternativkommentar 
zum GG (CH Beck, 2001) para 59; Ute Sacksofsky, Das Grundrecht auf Gleichberechtigung (2nd edn, No-
mos, 1996) 348–349; cf also BVerfGE 104, 373 (393); 113, 1 (15); BVerfG, EuGRZ 2010, 336 (343).  
76 Christine Fuchsloch, Das Verbot der mittelbaren Geschlechtsdiskriminierung (Nomos, 1995) 141f; 
Angelika Nußberger ‘Art. 3’ in Michael Sachs (ed.), GG-Kommentar (8th edn, CH Beck, 2018) paras 255-
257. 
77 Cf BVerfGE 97, 35 (43f); 121, 241 (254f). 
78 Cf Dagmar Schieck ‘Article 4’ in Dagmar Schieck (ed), AGG Kommentar aus europäischer Perspektive 
(CH Beck, 2007) para 2ff. On the intersectional nature of the grounds of discrimination cf ibid ‘Arti-
cle 2’ para 53ff, ‘Article 5’ para 28f, ‘Article 6’ para 25. 
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wear a headscarf for religious reasons’.79 Consequentially, the court reviewed the 
North Rhine-Westphalian education act in question under aspects of gender-based 
discrimination as well. 
h) Equal rights and the protection of marriage and the family, Ar-
ticle 6(1) GG 
For a long time, the protection of marriage and the family, enshrined in Article 
6(1) GG as a fundamental right was repeatedly used to justify disadvantages expe-
rienced by women in marriage and the family or by persons in same-sex relation-
ships. However, a clarification or turn in constitutional jurisdiction has been tak-
ing place in this regard as well: In its 2002 decision on the equivalence of family 
work and gainful employment in the assessment of post-marital maintenance, the 
FCC explicitly stated that Article 6(1) GG in conjunction with Article 3(2) GG pro-
tects marriage as a life community of equal partners.80 This means that the appli-
cation of Article 3(2) GG is not restricted by Article 6(1) GG; rather, it must be ex-
tended to the fundamental right of marriage. Hence the freedom of shaping one’s 
life in marriage cannot be used to justify the direct or indirect discrimination of 
women. On the contrary, real self-determination within the meaning of Article 
6(1) GG can only exist if the state ensures the independence of both spouses and 
eliminates gender-based discrimination related to marriage. However, provisions 
such as splitting income taxation for spouses (Ehegattensplitting), which indirectly 
reinforce the male breadwinner model, still stand in the way of reaching that 
goal. 
Following the lead of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)81, the FCC has 
increasingly strengthened the equal rights principle in family law as well. For 
example, the provision of Sec. 1626a BGB (old version), which gave the mother 
sole parental custody for children born out of wedlock, whereas joint parental 
custody could only be effected with the consent of the mother, was declared un-
constitutional because it infringes upon the father’s parental rights. This case, 
                                                 
79 BVerfGE 138, 296 (354), see Susanne Baer/Michael Wrase, ‘Zwischen Integration und „westlicher“ 
Emanzipation: Verfassungsrechtliche Perspektiven zum Kopftuch(-verbot) und der Gleichberechti-
gung’ (2006) Krit\ 375. 
80 BVerfGE 105, 1 (10f). 
81 Zaunegger v Germany (2009) ECHR 22028/0. 
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therefore, is an example of the elimination of the (indirect) discrimination of men 
based on traditional gender roles.82 
Moreover, in a landmark ruling on the unequal treatment of marriage and (same-
sex) registered civil partnerships of July 2009, the FCC emphasized the fact that 
the special protection of marriage enshrined in Article 6(1) GG does not entitle 
legislators to disadvantage other ways of life comparable to marriage—such as 
the former registered civil partnerships of same-sex couples. The authority to 
give favourable treatment to marriage over other ways of life does not give rise 
to a requirement contained in Article 6(1) GG to disadvantage other kinds of part-
nership in comparison to marriage.83 As a consequence of this new jurisdiction, 
the FCC declared unconstitutional the discrimination of registered civil partner-
ships with regard to inheritance and gift tax law (2010)84, the family allowance 
under civil service law (2012)85, successive adoption (2013)86, and income splitting 
tariffs for spouses (2013)87, thereby gradually opening the door, in terms of con-
stitutional law, towards same-sex marriage (‘marriage for all’).88 
3. The mandate to promote equal rights pursuant to Article 
3(2), sentence 2 GG 
a) The constitutional mandate to promote equal rights in Article 
3(2) GG 
As part of the 1994 review of the constitution, necessitated by German reunifica-
tion, the so-called mandate to promote gender equality (Förderauftrag) was insert-
ed into Article 3(2) GG. In the Joint Constitutional Committee (Gemeinsame Verfas-
sungskommission, GVK), the Social Democrats (SPD) preferred the more broadly 
                                                 
82 In an earlier decision, the FCC argued (albeit already with some doubts) that legislators legitimate-
ly assumed that mothers would only refuse the father’s wish to obtain joint custody in order to safe-
guard the child’s welfare. In that scenario, mothers would not abuse their possibility to refuse a joint 
custody declaration to exercise power over the father, cf BVerfGE 107, 150 (177). Empirical evidence 
has shown this assumption to be false. The available data suggest that mothers often refuse joint 
custody simply because they do not want to ‘share their inherent custody with the child’s father’, 
BVerfGE 127, 132 (159). 
83 BVerfGE 124, 199 (226). 
84 BVerfGE 126, 400. 
85 BVerfGE 131, 239. 
86 BVerfGE 133, 59. 
87 BVerfGE 133, 377. 
88 Act to Introduce the Right to Marry for Persons of the Same Sex of 20 July 2017, BGBl 2017 I 2787. 
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worded provision that ‘the state shall guarantee equal rights for women in all ar-
eas of society’ and called for the inclusion of an explicit provision regarding the 
legitimacy of measures specifically designed to advance women (the so-called 
compensatory clause), but the conservative camp for a long time resisted any 
amendments to Article 3(2) GG.89 Eventually, the parties agreed on a formulaic 
compromise: ‘The state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights 
for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.’ 
That wording satisfied everybody. CDU/CSU and FDP representatives were happy 
because neither the term Gleichstellung (implying equal treatment of men and 
women in practice) nor the compensatory clause appeared in the new provision. 
The compromise was viewed as a guarantee that compensatory measures such as 
quotas were now ‘off the table’.90 The SPD, in contrast, was happy that the consti-
tution now pointed out that there was a gap between the legal entitlement to 
equal rights and reality, and that the state had an explicit mandate to change this 
situation. Moreover, Social Democrats believed that to fulfil this constitutional 
mandate, compensatory measures such as quotas ‘should be permissible, after 
all’.91 
The disagreements in the Constitutional Committee are hard to understand. As 
early as in its 1992 night work decision, the FCC had ruled that the provision that 
‘men and women shall have equal rights’ in the first sentence of Article 3(2) GG 
not only constitutes a prohibition of unequal treatment but also seeks to promote 
gender equality in social reality in the future. As a consequence, laws designed to 
compensate for disadvantages in practice that typically affect women are deemed 
constitutional.92 That is why, in a ruling issued after the constitution was amend-
ed, the Court merely stated that this interpretation by the FCC ‘has in the mean-
time been clarified explicitly by adding sentence 2 to Article 3(2) GG.’93 
                                                 
89 Cf Kerstin Schweizer, Der Gleichberechtigungssatz – neue Form, alter Inhalt? (Duncker & Humblot, 
1998) 72ff. 
90 Kerstin Schweizer, Der Gleichberechtigungssatz – neue Form, alter Inhalt? (Duncker & Humblot, 
1998) 82. 
91 As in the words of delegate Hans-Jochen Vogel, GVK stenographic minutes, 23rd session, 19. For 
an overview and assessment of the discussion, see Jutta Limbach and Marion Eckertz-Höfer (eds.), 
Frauenrechte im Grundgesetz des geeinten Deutschland (Nomos, 1993). 
92 BVerfGE 85, 191 (207). 
93 BVerfGE 92, 91 (109); see also BVerfGE 104, 373 (393); 109, 64 (89), BVerfG NJW 2005, 2443. 
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b) Measures to promote equal treatment, especially quotas 
To this day, one crucial point of disagreement regarding Article 3(2) GG is the ex-
tent to which state measures to advance women are constitutionally permissi-
ble.94 Although such regulations constitute formal unequal treatment to the dis-
advantage of men in the meaning of Article 3(3) GG, they can be justified on the 
grounds of Article 3(2) GG as conflicting constitutional rights95 as long as they 
meet the principle of proportionality.96 
aa) Public incentive schemes 
In any case, the state has considerable freedom when granting public benefits to 
women with the goal of reducing their underrepresentation in specific areas of 
society. One example to illustrate this point is the 2002 decision of the Federal 
Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, BVerwG) on the start-up bonus 
for master craftspeople (Meistergründungsprämie).97 The state of North Rhine-
Westphalia wanted to pay such a bonus (worth DM 20,000) to young master 
craftsmen if they started their own business no later than two years after earning 
their master craftsman’s certificate. For young master craftswomen, that deadline 
was extended to five years. The complaint filed against this policy by a male mo-
torcar mechanic with reference to the principle of equal treatment was deemed 
unfounded by the BVerwG in the last instance of appeal.98 The unequal treatment 
of men and women, the court argued, was justified by the mandate to promote 
equal rights in Article 3(2) GG, noting that favouring women in the start-up bonus 
rule was intended to reduce their massive underrepresentation in the crafts sec-
tor. This underrepresentation was an expression of diverse objective and subjec-
tive obstacles, including a higher involvement in family work, lower financial 
means due to inferior employment opportunities, and almost ineradicable preju-
dices. The obstacles for women also include psychological barriers resulting from 
the absence of female role models, the reluctance of men to transfer their busi-
ness to a woman, or a certain risk averseness. Granting a subsidy, the court ar-
                                                 
94 For a discussion of a potential constitutional dimension of the equal treatment mandate from the 
point of view of a feminist constitutional law scholar, see Beate Rudolf, ‘Feministische 
Staatsrechtslehre?’ in Beate Rudolf (ed), Geschlecht im Recht (Wallstein 2009) 74ff. 
95 For a different opinion, see e.g. Ute Sacksofsky, Das Grundrecht auf Gleichberechtigung (2nd edn, 
Nomos, 1996) 372ff; Marion Eckertz-Höfer, ‘Art. 3(2),(3)’ in Erhard Denninger and others (eds.), Alter-
nativkommentar zum GG (CH Beck, 2001) para 64f., who both view Article 3(2) GG as lex specialis. In 
the end, however, this hardly makes a difference, because these authors also call for a (more moder-
ate) proportionality test. 
96 see BVerfGE 85, 191 (207); 92, 91 (109). 
97 BVerwG NVwZ 2003, 92. 
98 Different opinions of earlier instances: OVG Münster NWVBl 2002; VG Aachen ArbuR 1999, 494. 
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gued, was a common method for governments to encourage a desirable kind of 
behaviour. This method was especially suitable for overcoming such psychological 
barriers but also for eliminating economic obstacles. If the state wanted to en-
courage more women to start their own business in the crafts sector, extending 
the period in which the incentive is granted was a legitimate policy.99 Unlike 
granting privileges to women working in the public service sector, which always 
come at the expense of male competitors, providing financial incentives such as 
the start-up bonus is a measure that does not hurt anybody (the government 
might also choose to scrap the subsidy altogether). Hence, the court insisted, no 
legal regulation is required for such a measure. The mandate of Article 3(2) GG 
applies to all state authorities, including the administration when issuing funding 
guidelines as administrative regulations.100 
bb) Quotas 
Unlike public incentives, the use of quotas to achieve gender balance in hiring and 
promotion decisions in the public service sector has been fiercely controversial in 
political and legal terms from the outset. In her commentary on equal opportunity 
legislation, Dagmar Schiek, for example, points out that the so-called Frauenquote 
(women´s quota) is known to trigger ‘strong aggressive potential, reflected in nu-
merous court disputes and an intensive debate about its legitimacy in terms of 
constitutional and EU law’.101 
Most preferential treatment rules contained in federal and state equal opportuni-
ty legislation are not quotas in the true sense of the Latin source word quota 
(share). This would mean reserving a fixed share of positions or promotion oppor-
tunities for women.102 But instead of setting such gender-specific quotas, these 
laws contain decision-making rules to be applied on a case-by-case basis. This is 
meant by the term ‘decision-based quota’ (Entscheidungsquote). Two groups of reg-
ulations can be distinguished in that respect: true decision-based quotas and the 
so-called soft preferential treatment policies. Most of current equal opportunity 
legislation contains a true decision-based quota with a saving clause. Accordingly, 
in career fields where women are underrepresented, preference is to be given to 
                                                 
99 This approach has obviously proven to be successful: Since the deadline for establishing a busi-
ness was extended, the share of women among grant recipients has increased quite a bit from 15 per 
cent to 19 per cent. 
100 BVerwG NVwZ 2003, 92 (94). 
101 Dagmar Schiek and others (eds.), Frauengleichstellungsgesetze des Bundes und der Länder (2nd edn, 
Bund, 2002) para 252. 
102 Ibid para 239. 
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women ‘if their qualification, aptitude and professional performance are equal’ 
and ‘provided that no reasons prevail in the person of a competitor’.103 These 
regulations are legally binding and constitute individual entitlements to compli-
ance with the preferential treatment provision; that is, a rejected female candi-
date can invoke the provision before the courts and have her claims enforced, if 
necessary. Equal opportunity legislation in the states of Bavaria, Baden-
Württemberg, Saxony and Thuringia, by contrast, is limited to soft preferential 
treatment provisions that do not contain such an enforceable entitlement. Public 
authorities are merely instructed to raise the proportion of women in areas 
where they are underrepresented. How this goal is achieved is up to the recruit-
ment authority to decide.104 
The ‘quota’ could have become a test case for Article 3(2) GG in its new version and 
for the new jurisdiction of the FCC. However, the dispute was eventually brought 
before the ECJ with reference to equal treatment directive 76/207/EWG105 (now 
directive 2006/54/EC). The European judgements also brought clarity to the na-
tional arena106 and may be applied to the doctrine of Article 3 GG. Each case con-
cerns an encroachment on the right to equal treatment, which may be justified 
via the corresponding mandates to promote equal rights (Article 141(4) EGV old 
version, now Article 157 IV AEUV and Article 3(2), sentence 2 GG, respectively). The 
problematic issue in this context is proportionality, that is, whether or not the 
‘quota’ is suitable, necessary and appropriate. 
In its 1995 Kalanke decision—a case on the Bremen law on equal treatment for 
men and women in the public service—the ECJ had initially ruled rather apodicti-
cally that quota rules guaranteeing women ‘absolute and unconditional priority 
for appointment or promotion’ go beyond promoting equal opportunities and are 
therefore incompatible with Community law.107 Some believed this ruling sealed 
the fate of quotas.108 Two years later, however, in its Marschall decision109, the ECJ 
                                                 
103 Such a decision-based quota is found in the equal opportunity legislation of North Rhine-
Westphalia, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt, 
Schleswig-Holstein, and Rhineland-Palatinate; cf ibid para 223. 
104 Dagmar Schiek and others (eds.), Frauengleichstellungsgesetze des Bundes und der Länder (2nd edn, 
Bund, 2002) para 244. 
105 Extensively amended through Directive 2002/73/EG. 
106 Cf Sabine Berghahn, ‘Der Ritt auf der Schnecke: Rechtliche Gleichstellung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland’ in Mechthild Koreuber and Ute Mager (eds), Recht und Geschlecht (Nomos, 2004) 64. 
107 Case C-450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR I-3051. 
108 For detailed references, see Dagmar Schiek and others (eds.), Frauengleichstellungsgesetze des 
Bundes und der Länder (2nd edn, Bund, 2002) para 269. 
109 Case C-409/95 Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] NJW 1997, 3429. 
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changed its course. In that case, the court explicitly noted that even when qualifi-
cations are equal, employers tend to promote men rather than women.110 A pref-
erential treatment rule as it is found in the equal opportunity laws, the court ar-
gued, might counteract the real inequality of opportunity between men and wom-
en and thus reduce actual instances of inequality which exist in the reality of so-
cial life. Such a national rule was permissible, therefore, provided that it con-
tained a ‘saving clause’ to ensure that priority is not given to female candidates if 
special criteria in favour of the male candidate outweigh the priority rule. How-
ever, the ECJ added the important qualification that any criteria that may be con-
sidered in favour of the male candidate must not be such as to discriminate 
against female candidates.111 This means that many of the ‘auxiliary criteria’ used 
prior to the introduction of gender quotas aside from a candidate’s professional 
qualification—including seniority, number of relatives entitled to maintenance 
payments, military service performed, and the like, which de facto gave priority 
to men—must no longer be considered. As a consequence, however, the only cases 
in which the saving clause can become relevant in practice are those in which 
other factors of social discrimination, such as race or disability, come into play in 
the person of the male candidate, which make preferential treatment in his fa-
vour, by way of exception, appear justified.112 Another legitimate criterion is if a 
male applicant will perform typically ‘female’ tasks, for instance as a caretaker of 
children. 
In the 2000 Badeck decision, the ECJ reconfirmed the guidelines regarding the le-
gitimacy of decision-based quotas it had established in the Marschall decision.113 In 
its Abrahamsson decision, however, the court also clarified that giving preferen-
tial treatment to female candidates is only permissible if their qualifications are 
equal to those of male candidates. It thereby declared a Swedish rule in the higher 
education sector to be disproportionate, according to which preferential treat-
ment was given to the underrepresented gender even if a female candidate only 
had sufficient but inferior qualifications for a position than the male competi-
                                                 
110 Cf Case C-409/95 Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] NJW 1997, 3429 (3430): ‘[M]ale can-
didates tend to be promoted in preference to female candidates particularly because of prejudices 
and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in working life and the fear, for exam-
ple, that women will interrupt their careers more frequently, that owing to household and family 
duties they will be less flexible in their working hours, or that they will be absent from work more 
frequently because of pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding.‘ 
111 Cf Case C-409/95 Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] NJW 1997, 3429 (3430). 
112 See also Dagmar Schiek and others (eds), Frauengleichstellungsgesetze des Bundes und der Länder 
(2nd edn, Bund, 2002) para 284ff. 
113 Case C-158/97 Georg Badeck and others [2000] ECR I-1875. 
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tor.114 This case illustrates a key problem concerning the decision-based quota: At 
a time when the old assessment system with its tendency towards uniform grades 
becomes increasingly less relevant and is replaced by individual assessments, the 
instrumental effectiveness of quotas to support women is very doubtful.115 As Sab-
ine Berghahn concludes: ‘In practice, the quota remains a crutch that is hardly 
useful for enforcing results; if anything, it helps to raise awareness.’116 
The enforcement of an actual quota, for instance by reserving a specific number of 
senior positions for female candidates (the so-called reservation quota or fixed 
outcome quota), is incompatible with both national law (see also Article 33(2) GG) 
and European law owing to the requirement of equal qualifications. The situation 
is different with regard to training positions (such as apprenticeships) because 
these positions are designed to create such qualifications in the first place rather 
than requiring them117, and with regard to committees such as administrative and 
supervisory boards, in which membership is by election (or according to the prin-
ciple of an equal representation of men and women).118 The fixed gender quota of 
at least 30 per cent for new mandates in the supervisory boards of companies that 
are either listed or co-determined, introduced by the law of March 2015119 and 
effective as of 2016, can be assumed to be compatible not only with German con-
stitutional law, given the explicit mandate to promote de facto equal rights pursu-
ant to Article 3(2) GG, but also with European law.120 
                                                 
114 Case C-407/98 Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist [2000] ECR I-5539. 
115 Cf Dagmar Schiek and others (eds.), Frauengleichstellungsgesetze des Bundes und der Länder (2nd 
edn, Bund, 2002) para 250f. 
116 Sabine Berghahn, ‘Der Ritt auf der Schnecke: Rechtliche Gleichstellung in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland’ in Mechthild Koreuber and Ute Mager (eds.), Recht und Geschlecht (Nomos, 2004) 65. 
117 For a detailed discussion, see Dagmar Schiek and others (eds.), Frauengleichstellungsgesetze des 
Bundes und der Länder (2nd edition, Bund, 2002) paras 246, 289ff. 
118 Cf Case C-158/97 Georg Badeck and others [2000] ECR I-1875 para 65f. 
119 Act for the Equal Participation of Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the Private Sector 
and the Public Sector of 24 April 2015 (BGBl. I 642), last amended by the act of 11 April 2017 (BGBl. I 
802). 
120 Cf Joachim Wieland, ‘Ist eine Quotenregelung zur Erhöhung des Anteils der Frauen in Aufsichts-
räten mit dem Grundgesetz und Europarecht vereinbar?’ (2010) 33 NJW 2408, 2410; a representative 
example of the opposing position in Mathias Habersack/Jens Kersten, ‘Chancengleiche Teilhabe an 
Führungspositionen in der Privatwirtschaft - Gesellschaftsrechtliche Dimensionen und verfassungs-
rechtliche Anforderungen’ (2014) Betriebs-Berater 2819, 2827: exception clause required. 
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4. Conclusion and outlook 
In recent years, the Federal Constitutional Court’s interpretation of gender equali-
ty in Article 3(2) and (3) GG has been increasingly characterized by a substantive 
understanding. Important steps in that direction included the extension of juris-
diction on indirect discrimination and the inclusion of gender identity in the non-
discrimination clause of Article 3(3) GG. The key question, which has not yet been 
fully clarified, is whether the FCC will also apply the principles of substantive 
equality developed on gender to the other grounds of discrimination listed in Ar-
ticle 3(3) GG, that is, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, reli-
gious or political opinions, or disability. The systematic concept of Article 3(3) GG, 
which is based on a non-hierarchical understanding of the grounds of discrimina-
tion mentioned therein, suggests that this is inevitable.121 The fact that Article 3(2) 
GG makes special mention of the equal treatment of men and women is irrelevant 
in this respect, as the Court has emphasized in recent decisions, because this 
mandate is aimed at positive measures to promote equal rights (affirmative ac-
tion). Moreover, giving priority to gender over other grounds of discrimination 
such as race, faith, origin, or disability, would cause German constitutional law to 
fall significantly behind the status quo of European jurisdiction.122 This should not 
be in the interest of the FCC. Yet whether the Court is willing to give the rights of 
equality a similarly strong effect in the sense of effet utile as it has traditionally 
done for the rights of freedom beginning with the 1958 Lüth decision123 is some-
thing that remains to be seen. Whatever the case may be, the large number of 
pending cases and lawsuits to be expected will give the Court plenty of opportuni-
ties to refine and develop standards as regards the principle of non-
discrimination in the future. 
 
                                                 
121 Cf Anne Peters and Doris König, ‘Chapter 21: Das Diskriminierungsverbot’ in Oliver Dörr and 
others (eds.), EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (vol 
2, 2nd edn, Mohr Siebeck, 2013) paras 135ff. 
122 Cf Sandra Fredman, ‘Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 14 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 2 Human Rights Law Review 273. 
123 BVerfGE 7, 198 (204ff); see also the earlier BVerfGE 6, 55 (72), which called for giving preference 
to an interpretation of fundamental rights ‘that gives the strongest legal effect to the rule in ques-
tion’; cf Dieter Grimm, ‘The role of fundamental rights after sixty-five years of constitutional juris-
prudence in Germany’ (2015) 13 I-CON 9, 28-29. 
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